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Abstract
A key issue in cooperation research is to determine the conditions under which individuals invest in a public good. Here, we
tested whether cues of being watched increase investments in an anonymous public good situation in real life. We
examined whether individuals would invest more by removing experimentally placed garbage (paper and plastic bottles)
from bus stop benches in Geneva in the presence of images of eyes compared to controls (images of flowers). We provided
separate bins for each of both types of garbage to investigate whether individuals would deposit more items into the
appropriate bin in the presence of eyes. The treatment had no effect on the likelihood that individuals present at the bus
stop would remove garbage. However, those individuals that engaged in garbage clearing, and were thus likely affected by
the treatment, invested more time to do so in the presence of eyes. Images of eyes had a direct effect on behaviour, rather
than merely enhancing attention towards a symbolic sign requesting removal of garbage. These findings show that simple
images of eyes can trigger reputational effects that significantly enhance on non-monetary investments in anonymous
public goods under real life conditions. We discuss our results in the light of previous findings and suggest that human
social behaviour may often be shaped by relatively simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms instead of very complex
cognitive capacities.
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Introduction
A central issue in evolutionary biology is to understand
cooperative behaviour among unrelated and unfamiliar individ-
uals [1,2,3,4,5]. A main topic in this context is the question why
individuals invest in a public good that everyone is free to exploit
or overuse [6]. Without mechanisms to prevent exploitation, such
public resources are predicted to collapse and end up in the so-
called ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ [7]. To understand under which
conditions individuals choose to invest in a public good is not only
of theoretical interest, but also of practical importance as some
major problems humans face today, such as climate change, the
financial crisis and over-exploitation of natural resources,
ultimately result from a lack of cooperation in social dilemma
situations [8,9]. A social dilemma arises when all individuals enjoy
the collective benefits of a public resource (such as an intact
atmosphere) that can only be sustained when individuals refrain
from over-using it, but economically rational actors do best by free
riding. Similarly, individuals that do not contribute in producing
or maintaining a public good (such as a clean environment) do best
by profiting from, but not contributing to, the investments of
others [10]. While a number of studies indicate that a significant
fraction of individuals tend to start out cooperatively, the negative
feedback resulting from defecting individuals typically causes
a cooperation break down [11,12]. However, the tragedy is not
inevitable as we frequently do observe cooperation in social
dilemma situations. Therefore, the question emerging is: which
mechanisms contribute to maintain cooperation in such situations?
Research over the last three decades suggests that one important
mechanism to explain cooperation in such situations is reputation
or ‘indirect reciprocity’ [13,14]. The underlying logic is that
individuals with a good reputation receive more help than
individuals with a worse reputation. Therefore, as helping others
enhances reputation, individuals should behave more coopera-
tively when observed by others compared to when they are
unobserved. Theoretical models have shown that cooperation can
be maintained if individuals use information about the previous
interaction of individuals and are more likely to cooperate with
individuals that have helped others before. Individuals with a good
reputation should be preferred as cooperation partners and
therefore defecting individuals incur indirect costs resulting from
a poor reputation [15]. This has recently been demonstrated
empirically [16,17]. A number of controlled lab experiments have
also shown that individuals increase their cooperative investments
when they know their behaviour is monitored [18,19,20].
Moreover, examples from changes of the behaviour and policy
of large institutions also illustrate the power of reputational effects.
For instance, since a few years leading financial institutions
demand an environmental and social risk assessment before
financing large scale industrial projects as part of their risk and
reputation management strategy [21].
One approach to test whether individuals modify their
behaviour in the presence of others is to investigate whether they
respond to being watched. For instance, mutual eye gaze has been
shown to increase contributions to a public good without any
change in anonymity [22]. Recent studies found that individuals
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like spots on the background of the computer on which they
complete a task [23,24,25,26]. Even though relatively abstract cues
elicited behavioural responses in some of the studies, most of them
were conducted under somewhat artificial lab conditions, which
may limit the applicability of the results to real world interactions.
However, two studies also suggest that images of eyes enhance
cooperation under real life settings [27,28]. In one of these studies,
images of pairs of eyes enhanced contributions to a honesty box
used to collect money for drinks in the coffee room of a research
group at the University of Newcastle compared to controls (images
of flowers). Hence, cues of being watched appeared to enhance the
exchange of money for an open uncontrolled resource (milk, which
was a proxy for tea and coffee) due to reputational effects. Another
more recent study showed that images of eyes decrease the
likelihood that people would leave litter at their table in
a University cafeteria [28].
In the present study, we aimed at going one step further in
several aspects to investigate the effects of simple cues of being
watched under realistic conditions. We asked whether individuals
would invest in a public good (a clean environment) even without
receiving any material good (such as money) in exchange.
Furthermore, we investigated whether images of pairs of eyes
would enhance investments (removal of foreign garbage) among
unfamiliar individuals at public locations. We tested 14 different
bus stops; hence, in contrast to many studies that only used
students at the University, our sample comes closer to a random
sample of the population. In order to obtain information about the
precise investments of each individual we directly observed
people’s behaviour. Finally, we combined our behavioural data
with a questionnaire to investigate whether images of eyes have
a direct effect on cooperative behaviour, or whether the presence
of eyes caused an increase in investment merely by enhancing
attention towards a sign that requested cooperative behaviour
(here: disposal of garbage).
If reputational effects cause an increase in investment in a public
good, we predicted that cues of being watched (an image of eyes)
enhance the likelihood and the amount of investment involved in
removing garbage from a public location (a bus stop bench)
compared to controls (an image with flowers). If images of eyes
have a direct effect on behaviour that is not mediated by an
increase in attention towards a sign requesting garbage removal,
we predicted that the sign would not be noticed more often in the
presence of eyes, compared to in the control.
Methods
(a) Experiment
DF conducted the experiments at 14 different bus stops in
Geneva (Switzerland). The tests were carried out at bus stops that
were equipped in a similar way (with a bench and a bus stop
shelter, Fig. 1). We selected bus stops according to the following
criteria: (1) opposite bus stops allowed us to observe the subjects
inconspicuously so they did not feel monitored by the observer, (2)
the duration between successive buses allowed for observation and
asking questions to the subject (at least 8 minutes between
successive busses). Each bus stop was only used once (throughout
one experimental day) in order to avoid to repeatedly testing the
same persons. Before start of the experiment we placed two
garbage bins with signs (one for plastic and one for paper garbage)
at both sides of the bench so that the garbage could be separated
according to garbage type. We placed three items of garbage on
the bus stop bench (two empty plastic bottles (PET) of 1.5 l volume
and a news paper) in such a way that the subjects needed to move
away at least one item in order to sit down (Fig. 1). We attached
a sign (Fig. 2) requesting that garbage should be thrown away
above the bus stop bench (approximately at eye level, i.e. about
1.5 m high) so that each person in front or within the bus stop
would be likely to notice it (Fig. 1). Below the sign we either
attached one of five different photos of a pair of eyes, or one of five
different images of flowers (size 12.062.8 cm) (Fig. 2).
Each test started when a bus left the bus stop, so there was
a ‘‘clean’’ experimental situation without any people present. We
observed the behaviour of the first subject approaching the bus
stop for 2 minutes and recorded the following information:
whether or not subject handled (handling refers in all cases to
deposition of objects into the bins) garbage, duration of handling
items (seconds), location of depositing the items (in which of the
two bins the item was deposited), and whether subjects remained
standing or sat down on the bench. Furthermore, we recorded the
gender of the person. Two minutes after arrival of the subject, we
approached the subject to conduct our questionnaire. Treatments
(eyes/flowers) were exchanged about every 2 hours and the type of
eye and flower was presented in random order.
(b) Questionnaire
After the observations ended we approached the persons and
asked the following questions: Did you notice the sign? Did you
notice the eyes/flowers? Did you feel observed by me (the
observer)? After the questionnaire, subjects were informed about
the underlying reasons for the experiment and the questionnaire.
All data were recorded and analysed anonymously.
(c) Data analyses
We only included observations in our analyses in which the
conditions concerning our question of interest were appropriate,
i.e., subjects were alone at the bus stop for at least 2 minutes and
subjects positioned themselves in front of the bus stop so they could
see, and potentially be affected by the sign and the experimental
garbage. We first analysed the overall effect of the treatment on
whether or not individuals engaged in garbage clearing. For the
detailed analyses of behavioural differences depending on the
treatment we only analysed those cases in which people engaged in
garbage removal. This is because individuals that did not clear
Figure 1. Experimental set up at bus stations. Three items of
garbage (2 PVC bottles (1a) and a newspaper (1b)) were placed on the
bus stop bench. Two experimental wastebaskets with signs, one for
plastic (2a) and one for paper (2b) were placed, one at each side of the
bus stop bench. Above the bus stop bench (in eye height, about 1.5 m)
a symbolic sign (3) indicating to throw away garbage was attached.
Below the sign either an image of eyes or flowers (4) was placed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037397.g001
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possible to assess the effects of the treatment on their behaviour. In
a first step, we tested whether individuals invested more time in
handling garbage in the presence of images of eyes compared to
the control. In a second step, we investigated whether the amount
of time invested was positively correlated to the number of items
handled, the number of items place into the correct bin or, the
proportion of items placed into the correct bin (precision). Because
of the low sample size of people that were willing to respond to our
questionnaire, we included all available responses to the question-
naire in the analyses, including those of people that were excluded
from the behavioural analyses because of methodological con-
siderations (e.g., when the person was not alone during two
minutes after arrival). As some individuals left with the bus before
they had answered the full questionnaire we do not have the same
amount of answers for each question (between 18–30 answers per
question could be analysed). All results reported are two-tailed and
were performed with SPSS version 16.0. P-values,0.05 are
considered as statistically significant and p-values.=0.05 but
,0.1 are reported as non-significant trends.
(d) Ethical note
For our study we did not obtain a formal ethical permit from the
ethical board because we instead avoided all manipulations that
could have raised ethical concerns. We adhered to the Ethical
standards of the Suisse Society for Psychology (Schweizer
Gesellschaft fu ¨r Psychology) and to the checklist for ethical
consideration of psychological studies (‘‘Checkliste fu ¨r die ethische
Beurteilung von Psychologischen Forschungsvorhaben’’, see www.
ssp-sgp.ch/ethik.htm). According to this checklist, we avoided any
treatments that might have negatively affected the psychological or
social integrity of our study subjects in any way. In detail, we did
not use any invasive methods in our experiment, but observed
behaviour in the field using a small experimental manipulation.
We presented images of eyes at bus stop benches to investigate
whether persons would be more inclined to remove experimentally
applied garbage into garbage bins. This small manipulation of the
environment can safely be assumed not to be harmful to persons in
any way. According to the Ethical standards, we did not apply
aversive stimuli or induce negative emotions in any way. Also, our
experiment did not have any negative impacts on the reputation of
the tested persons as they remained fully anonymous. We did not
collect any personalised data and did not film or tape the
behaviours and responses of the test persons. We did not ask
questions to persons that were underage or otherwise potentially
inhibited in their ability to judge persons. Test subjects were fully
free not to respond to our questions and were informed and asked
for consent to use their anonymous responses for the purpose of
our study after responding. Our questionnaire was designed so it
did not contain any questions that asked for potentially
emotionally disturbing personal experiences or political prefer-
ences.
Results
(1) Did images of eyes enhance investments in a public
good?
About one third (28 of 93) of the subjects placed garbage into
the bins. When testing all persons present at the bus stop, the
treatment had no significant effect on the likelihood that
individuals would handle (handling allways refers to depositing
objects into the bins) garbage items (NFlowers_no-handling=32;
NFlowers_handling=12; NEyes_no-handling=33; NEyes_handling=16;
Chi
2=0.32; p=0.57). Individuals who sat down on a bus bench
tended to be more likely to handle garbage items compared to
individuals who remained standing (Chi
2:N Standing_no-handling=32;
NStanding_handling=8; N Sitting_no-handling=33; NSitting_handling=20;
Chi
2=3.41; p=0.065).
Using only the data from people that engaged in handling
garbage (and therefore were likely subject to the treatment), people
invested about twice the time in handling garbage in the presence
of eye images as opposed to flower images (Fig. 3; Mann-Whitney
U test: NEyes=16; NFlowers=12; Z=22.17; p=0.03). Half of
these persons (14 out of 28) removed and deposited more than one
garbage item into the bins, sometimes up to all three items.
The amount of time people invested in handling garbage items
correlated positively with the number of items handled (Spear-
men’s rank correlation, N=28, c=0.67, p,0.001) and with the
number of items people deposited into the correct bin (N=28,
c=0.50, p=0.007). However, the proportion of items deposited
Figure 2. Treatments (images of eyes) and controls (images of flowers).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037397.g002
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handling duration (N=27, c=0.08, p=0.69). Significant results
remain significant when adjusting the critical p-value for multiple
testing (critical p=0.017).
(2) Did images of eyes have a direct effect on behaviour?
Using the data from the questionnaire we tested whether eyes
could have caused the effect of higher investment in the treatment
by raising the attention towards the sign that instructed subjects to
throw away garbage. We analysed whether individuals noticed the
sign more often when eyes were present compared to the control.
Individuals noticed the sign more often when flowers were present
compared to in the presence of eyes (NFlowers_not noticed=5;
NFlowers_noticed=8; N Eyes_not noticed=13; NEyes_noticed=4;
Chi
2=4.43; p=0.042), suggesting that the effect of the eyes
cannot be explained by increased attention towards the sign
requesting garbage removal. There was no difference concerning
how often people reported to have noticed the experimental eyes
or flowers (NFlowers_not noticed=8; N Flowers_noticed=5; N Eyes_not
noticed=12; NEyes_noticed=5; Chi
2=0.27; p=0.60). None of 18
individuals responded to have felt observed by the experimenter in
the opposite bus stop (NFlowers=8,N Eyes=10).
Discussion
A central issue in the study of human cooperation is the
question about which mechanisms promote investments into
public goods. While theoretical and lab studies showed that
reputation can enhance cooperation under certain conditions
[14,18,19,29], as yet only two experimental studies investigated
whether reputational effects can enhance cooperation in realistic
settings [27,28]. In accordance with the previous studies, our
results suggest that simple cues of being watched can enhance
investments in a real life public good. Eye images resulted in
a significant increase in the amount of time that people spent
removing garbage as people spent about twice the time handling
garbage in the treatment. While people invested in depositing the
items into the appropriate bin, there was no evidence that
treatment affected precision (proportion of items deposited into the
correct bin). In accordance with a previous study [28] our results
suggest that it was indeed the cues of eyes that caused this effect
(not increased attention towards the sign requesting removal of
garbage) as persons noticed the sign that requested people to
deposit garbage more often in the presence of flowers compared to
in the presence of images of eyes. Our study provides evidence in
a real life situation in humans that subtle reputational effects such
as simple cues of being watched can enhance investments in public
goods among anonymous and unfamiliar individuals.
(a) Why did individuals invest in public goods?
Reputation has been shown to foster cooperation also in public
good games [19]. However, the idea that simple images of eyes
could result in reputational effects on human behaviour seem
surprising at first glance. This is because this implies that images of
eyes can shape behaviour despite of the absence of real human
observers. Cues of being watched appear to work by means of
evolved psychological mechanisms that are cognitively robust in
the sense that they are treated as a real observer despite of obvious
evidence to the contrary. However, this finding is perhaps not so
surprising, given that building up a reputation requires much time
and energy and losing a good reputation can be quick and might
have strong and lasting negative effects. Hence, the mere risk of
losing a good reputation may have selected for high responsiveness
towards critical cues (such as eyes watching) and corresponding
changes in behaviour (i.e. enhanced cooperativeness of individuals
that are watched) [23,24,27,28,30]. This is especially so under
non-anonymous conditions in which individuals can monitor each
other’s behaviours most of the time, a situation which appears to
have prevailed throughout large parts of human evolutionary
history in small-scale societies.
Based on this reasoning, we suggest that the most parsimonious
explanation for our results is that images of eyes triggered
a reputational response and that the personal benefits individuals
Figure 3. Handling duration of garbage was increased in the treatment (image of eyes) compared to the control (image of flowers).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037397.g003
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ments in the public good [31,32]. This hypothesis is corroborated
by several findings. Individuals invested more time in handling
garbage in the presence of eyes compared to in the control
situation. The reason appears to be that individuals handled more
garbage items in the presence of eyes. We can exclude the possible
alternative explanation that the images of eyes were more effective
at attracting people’s attention towards the symbolic sign
compared to flowers, as people noticed the sign requesting
garbage removal more often in the presence of flowers compared
to in the presence of eyes.
A second potential explanation for our findings is that images of
eyes have been perceived as a direct threat of punishment (instead
of the more indirect threat of obtaining a bad reputation).
Punishment has been suggested to enhance cooperation across
taxa [33,34] and a threat of punishment might have been the
reason for why people invested more in the presence of cues of
eyes. However, we are not aware of any study showing that images
of eyes alone can indeed elicit a threat response. As yet it remains
unclear whether this factor might have contributed in explaining
our results.
(b) Why did images of eyes only affect the behaviour of
persons who engaged in garbage clearing?
About one third of the subjects cooperated by disposing
garbage. This proportion seems relatively high, given that
individuals did not obtain any material benefits from their
contribution. Overall (including all individuals that were present
at the bus stop) people were not more likely to engage in garbage
clearing in the presence of images of eyes. Hence, it appears that
cues of being watched were not sufficient in our setting to trigger
a behavioural response. However, this interpretation should be
treated with caution. Three reasons might have contributed to the
lack of a treatment effect on whether or not people engaged in
garbage clearing.
First, an implicit rule might have been acting only for people
who wished to sit down. This is the rule: ‘‘If you produce garbage,
then you must dispose of it properly.’’ As we placed the garbage
ourselves at the bus stop, this rule likely did not affect people who
remained in some distance from the bus stop bench. However for
people who wished to sit down this rule likely became relevant.
These people were in a way ‘‘forced’’ to ‘‘take possession’’ of the
garbage, as a potential passer-by could assume that the passenger
had generated the garbage and was littering. The finding that the
motivation to sit down appeared to trigger removal of garbage
corroborates this, as persons who sat down tended to be more
likely to engage in garbage removal. However, if individuals only
wanted to sit down, they could have done so by simply pushing
aside a garbage item without even touching it with the hands
(personal observation). Moreover, in order to sit down, it would
have been sufficient to remove only one of the three items. Instead,
half of the persons removed and deposited more than one garbage
item into the bins. Hence, individuals invested more than
necessary to sit down and this amount of surplus investment
appears to have been modulated by the presence of eyes.
Secondly, not all people who were present at the bus stop might
have been affected by the treatment. In contrast to the situation in
a University kitchen, in which individuals prepared their drink in
front of the experimental cues of being watched [27], people in our
study, particularly when they did not approach the bench in order
to sit down and therefore remained in some distance to the
treatment, might not have been affected by the treatment.
Including these cero values therefore potentially precluded finding
any effect of the treatment.
Third, handling of foreign garbage creates a high threshold for
actually engaging in behaviour as many people might sicken at the
idea to handle potentially dirty foreign rubbish. The threshold
involved in engaging in removal of foreign garbage (e.g., potential
risks of infection) may be too high to be surpassed by subtle cues of
being watched.
In our field study we encountered several additional sources of
variation compared to other studies, partly resulting from our
attempt to enhance realism. These may have increased the
variance in our data and thereby might have decreased the size of
the effect. By placing a sign to dispose garbage we may have raised
the attention to an injunctive norm (disapproval of littering).
Studies suggest that injunctive norms coupled with a conflicting
descriptive norm (in our case the presence of litter indicating that
people litter at this bus stop) might reduce the likelihood to engage
in cooperative behaviour (here: antilittering) [35]. Furthermore, in
our study, individuals were unfamiliar to each other; they were
tested at pubic locations and were not tested more than once.
Finally, we tested individuals at 14 different bus stops with
potential local differences in the type of persons (the different
locations in Geneva are inhabited by persons from different social
and cultural groups) and other environmental variables.
(c) Why is there mixed evidence concerning the effects of
image of eyes?
Overall, a number of studies (including this study) found effects
of cues of being watched on behaviour [23,24,27,28] while others
did not [36] or only when the audience was familiar [37]. In one
study, the mere presence of observers had no effect on the
tendency of proposers to cooperate in an ultimatum game, but
proposers responded to the degree of anonymity and the presence
or absence of familiar individuals [37]. Cues of eyes did also not
affect the behaviour of players in a trust game [36]. A potential
reason for this lack of effect might be that both these studies were
framed in a game situation with two interacting parties.
Consequently, people might have been focussing on the in-
teraction (the action of the partner), which could have distracted
them from the subtle cues of being watched by a third party. In
accordance with this interpretation, most of the studies that found
effects of cues of being watched took place in a public good
situation in which individuals invest in a common pool [24,27,28].
Interaction effects with other participants in such a game appear to
be limited. Two studies found effects in a dictator game [23,25].
However, this ‘‘game’’ does not reflect a full-fledged interaction as
only the proposer makes a decision about how to split a certain
amount of money while the receiver passively accepts the money
(which is why the dictator game is not formally considered a game).
Overall, the combined results of previous studies and this study
suggest that the subtle effects of cues of being watched by a third
party can be cancelled out when individuals are directly
interacting, but that they can take effect when individuals are
not distracted by an interaction with others.
(d) Why is it critical to conduct experiments under real
life conditions?
Many studies that investigated contributions to public goods
have been conducted under highly controlled lab conditions that
allow for explicit testing of particular parameters of interest
[19,38]. While the results of these studies provide important
information about the mechanisms underlying behaviour, the
applicability of the findings to real-world settings requires to be
determined [24,27,28,39]. For instance, many lab studies are
conducted using only a fraction of the population (University
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the extreme may cause artefacts [40,41]. Moreover, it is important
to establish whether the behavioural responses persons show
towards computer screens and under artificial lab conditions
indeed reflect behaviour under more realistic settings. Studies on
cooperation under controlled lab conditions typically operate with
money gains and losses as a result of the interaction. Here we show
that individuals increase investments based on reputational cues,
even if no monetary rewards are involved. Other incentives than
monetary gains or losses may often be involved in cooperative
behaviour in real life. For instance, a study showed that individuals
are more likely cease contributing to a public good if they perceive
cues about free riding of others. This study showed that individuals
were more likely to cheat by leaving kitchenware in the sink
unwashed, when unwashed items were already present, compared
to in the absence of unwashed items [12]. Other examples of non-
monetary incentives enhancing cooperation include attractiveness
to the opposite sex [42], or access to more cooperative partners
[15].
Conclusion
Theory and reality about human behaviour have repeatedly
been shown to deviate considerably, one of the latest examples
being the financial crisis [43]. To obtain a more accurate picture
about the mechanisms underlying human cooperative behaviour,
experiments under settings as realistic as possible are required
[39]. Such experiments might lead to the conclusion that, instead
of the complex cognitive processes that are often assumed to
generally underlie human social behaviour, sometimes relatively
simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms may be acting
[44]. A better understanding of human cooperative behaviour in
real life is of key interest both from theoretical and practical
perspective. Several major problems humans face today such as
climate change, financial crisis and over-exploitation of natural
resources arise from the potential for a tragedy of the commons,
i.e. a cooperation break down in a social dilemma [8,45]. Field
studies investing why individuals invest in a common good at
a small scale are crucial to understand cooperation also in higher
levels of human social organisation, i.e. organisations and nations
[46].
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